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Abstract 
The Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC) System Security Engineering Research Roadmap recommends 
that systems security research proceed in part by studying systems engineering methods, processes, and tools (MPTs) 
that are well established in disciplines that are related to security or have similar goals or objectives. Successful 
MPTs in these areas should be examined for possible application to systems security. If the MPTs in the toolset of 
nearby disciplines seem to be applicable to system security, this could provide a quick and easy method of expanding 
the toolset of metrics currently available to SSE. This study follows the recommendation with a critical examination 
of methods for diversity in reactor protection systems where the goal is safety. It adapts the reactor-specific method 
for achieving diversity for the purposes of safety into a method for systems security engineering that may be applied 
generally to any system. 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection  
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1. Introduction 
The Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC) team consisting of participants from X 
Universities, recently produced a System Security Engineering Research Roadmap [1]. The report 
acknowledged that systems security engineering was currently an immature discipline, and made concrete 
recommendations for necessary next steps. One such recommendation was to study systems engineering 
methods, processes, and tools (MPTs) that are well established in disciplines that are related to security or 
have similar goals or objectives. In particular, the fields of safety and security engineering have been 
compared and contrasted in studies that also have recommended that this field be further examined for 
possible application to systems security [2, 3]. If the MPTs in the toolset of nearby disciplines seem to be 
applicable to system security, this could potentially provide a direct method of expanding the toolset of 
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metrics currently available to SSE. This study follows the recommendation with a critical examination of 
methods for diversity in reactor protection systems. It adapts the reactor-specific method for achieving 
diversity for the purposes of safety into a method for systems security engineering that may be applied 
more generally to systems in many domains.   
This paper summarizes how the Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of 
Reactor Protection Systems (the “source document” [2]) may be generally applied to identify potential 
design flaws that may impact systems security.  It does not repeat the safety design considerations 
described in that document, it instead restates the concepts in that document in terms of how they apply to 
security. The methodology in the source document is herein converted into a method for evaluating 
systems security. 
Although the source document is focused entirely on safety systems, in this adaptation for security, we 
are agnostic as to the mission or purpose of the system under evaluation. We do, however, require that 
there is a measurement which will validate whether or not the mission or purpose is met. This 
measurement is referred to as the “system goal for security validation.” For a given system, this goal may 
consist of multiple measures. It is analogous to the requirement in the source document that analysis must 
show that the goal of “not exceeding the 10 CFR 100 dose limits, violation of the integrity of the primary 
coolant pressure boundary, or violation of the integrity of the containment” has been met.   
2. Method Pattern 
The source document describes a method for solving a given type of problem. At this level, it is similar 
to prior work in the field of security pattern identification and application [4]. The security pattern 
community consists primarily of software engineers who have common experience in providing standard 
cyber security features for networked applications. Examples of these are single-sign-on, reference 
monitors, and audit requirements. A security pattern is an architecture that provides a well-proven solution 
for a recurring design problem. The method described by the source document is a pattern that is given a 
name in the context of an example problem and solution. The solution is depicted as a combination of 
structure and dynamics. In the case of the source document, the problem may be described generically as: 
“how can one prevent harm caused by operation of critical systems?” The fact that the fear of harm that 
motivated the problem solution was concern about safety does not affect the general applicability of the 
pattern to other threats that may cause harm, and these include security. 
The solution presented by the method is also part of the pattern. The pattern community depicts 
solutions in terms of structure and dynamics. In the case of the model, the structure is described as the 
system modules and system model. The dynamics are described in terms of the diversity in functionality 
distributed in the system modules that collectively reduce the risk of system-induced harm. The dynamics 
of this diversity is supported with techniques for analysis, as well as a scoring framework. Each of these 
aspects of the method pattern are individually described in the following sections. 
3. System Modules 
The method proscribes a defense-in-depth approach using four echelons of defense. Defense-in-depth 
has long been a military concept, designed to call attention to vulnerabilities in battlefield configurations, 
and has been adopted as a security engineering concept since the late 1990s [5]. It is straightforwardly 
adapted to highlight potential single causes of safety failure, and the recommended four echelons of 
defense may be considered as distinct system modules. In the context of system security, they are:  
1. Design system using a concept of operations that integrates controls that achieve the system 
goal for security validation with mainline system functionality (“control system”).  
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2. Establish an automated set of security features that will achieve the system goal for security 
validation that operates independently from the control system (this is an industry standard 
in security, generically known as a “tripwire” [6]).  
3. Establish an integrated set of security features that performs security response functions in 
an automated manner, based on pre-established indicators that goal achievement is at risk 
(“engineered security actuation”).  
4. Create manual processes and procedures for monitoring and presentation of security goal 
achievement and feature utilization, with a control console that should be capable of 
overriding and/or replacing automated security features (“monitoring and indication 
echelon”). 
 
4.  System Model 
 
The safety method requires that system architecture be parsed into three high level functional 
components: channels, instrumentation, and blocks. Channels process input from sensors and output to 
device interfaces. Instrumentation systems receive, process, store, and transmit signals from channels 
according to predefined logic. Blocks are partitions of systems components for which it can be credibly 
argued that impact from internal failures, including software errors, will not propagate to other blocks. 
The method requires that the target system be modeled using channels, instrumentation, and blocks.  A 
similar concept in security engineering is a black-box mode transition diagram as illustrated in Figure 1. 
In the method pattern, each system component has its own set of states and there is not one black box 
which is the system, but several black boxes of system components responsible for moving information to 
and from various channels. In each component, some combination of information processed is expected to 
actuate security responses. Figure 2 shows an example functional decomposition that could feasibly be 
designed to ensure that internal failure in any one block would not adversely impact others, and would 
still be capable of producing the desired combination of inputs and outputs identified in the system level 
functional model of Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Black-box Mode Transition Diagram 
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5. Diversity Overview 
 
The core of the safety diversity analysis is to show that the four echelons of defense (i.e., control 
system, tripwire, engineered security actuation, and monitoring and indication echelon) are sufficiently 
diverse from each other in order to back each other up should the need arise. The analysis method relies 
on a classification of diversity into six elements, human, design, software, functional, signal, and 
equipment. These are understood in the context of systems security as follows: 
Human:        segregation of duties for critical system and security feature operation 
Design:  alternative functional decomposition of solutions for the same security function,             
presumably resulting in selection of different components for different designs 
Software:   alternative functions employed to achieve similar security results, such as multiple 
factors of authentication or out-of-band in addition to in-band alerting 
Functional: alternative functions employed to achieve similar security results, such as multiple 
factors of authentication or out-of-band in addition to in-band alerting 
Signal:  multiple detection mechanisms for security incidents of the same type such as virus 
delivery via network intrusion detection systems and host anti-virus software 
Equipment: physically distinct components provide the same or overlapping security features 
In order to demonstrate that any of these types of diversity exist for any given security feature, 
evidence must be presented that there are no failure modes that are causally related. That is, there should 
not be any one cause, environmental, design-related, maintenance errors, whose consequences would 
cause a failure in two items that are claimed to be diverse. Such failures are referred to as common mode 
failures (CMF). The diversity analysis must show that appropriate set of the six types of diversity avoid 
CMFs shared among the four echelons of defense for anticipated operational occurrences and 
unanticipated accidents, regardless of the frequency of expected occurrence. 
 
6. Diversity Analysis 
 
Guidelines for diversity analysis in the source document note that it should be performed with the 
assumption that the four echelons create a functional hierarchy of security support wherein common 
system failure types are expected to first target normal operation. If it can be anticipated that a system goal 
for security validation may be in jeopardy, the tripwire should activate. If the system goal for security 
Fig, 2: Independent Block Diagram 
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validation can be buttressed via automated measures, the engineered security actuation should do so. All 
of this type of potential failure activity should be capable of being manually monitored with diverse 
infrastructure via the monitoring and indication echelon. Such monitoring capability should be 
accompanied by a diverse capability for manual response to maintain system goals for security validation. 
Where responsibility is placed on a system operator to detect and react to security incidents, sufficient 
information, rimes for operator analysis should be part of the evidence presented in the argument that such 
diversity exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reports on diversity analysis should clearly identify system scope and failure types, of which at least 
three should be considered. The first type of failure may occur due to the control system not responding to 
a threat to system goals for security validation. This type of failure is expected to trigger a tripwire 
defense. A second failure type would be the lack of adequate detection that system goal for security 
validation is in jeopardy, and a corresponding awareness only when an environmental change brings it to 
operator attention. This type of failing silently would presumably have a CMF between control and 
tripwire echelons as its root cause. Defense against these failures should be the province of appropriately 
diverse engineered security actuation in combination with the monitoring and indication echelon. The 
third failure type is that of an active malfunction, such as one wherein sensors produce false or anomalous 
readings, and this unpredicted activity is readily apparent. At a minimum, it should be possible to 
compensate for such occurrences with diversity that can stabilized system security goal achievement while 
a solution is underway. 
Any assumptions made in the course of a diversity analysis should be explicitly states and should 
identify the worst-case consequences to the system from any anticipated event or accident. Assumptions 
concerning automated diagnostic software should be considered suspect. Assumptions concerning timing 
of information delivery should assume maximum latency, which could mean complete lack of information 
delivery. 
Assumptions may also be made in the analysis of system block diversity. These should be 
accompanied by an assurance arguments of the type described in ISO/IEC 15026 [7]. A design description 
should include design basis threats and specific metrics support claims for system security goal 
Fig. 3: Diversity Expectations 
343Jennifer Bayuk et al. / Procedia Computer Science 8 (2012) 338 – 344
Bayuk / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2012) 000–000 
achievement. It should include detailed diagrams and analysis charts comparing the functionality of block-
level components. 
 
7. Diversity Scoring Framework   
 
In addition to providing guidelines for diversity analysis, the source document also outlines a 
methodology for comparing alternative architectures and assessing the level of risk mitigation provided by 
a given architecture. This is achieved by assessing the amount of diversity offered by a particular system's 
architecture—based on the principal that more diversity in a system results in less susceptibility to 
failures. A system's diversity is evaluated through the application of a weighted rank ordering process that 
utilizes a wide range of criteria, such as differing technologies, similar technologies within different 
architectures, and different manufacturers of fundamentally different designs. A weighting scheme has 
been determined based upon assumptions and principals derived from designers'. The method is not 
supported by an underlying mathematical theory, but the results permit the system evaluators and system 
designers to engage in a constructive dialogue regarding the attention paid in a specific design. Similarly, 
there is a call for security analysis methodologies that are able to compare alternative system security 
architectures accounting for the selection and integration of security services, as well as the details of 
specific service designs. As outlined in [8], such a methodology could be created based upon the source 
document’s diversity scoring methodology. Such a methodology would include identifying the potential 
contribution and importance of individual security services, determining the potential effectiveness of the 
security contribution of each service to a particular design, and evaluating the cost and collateral impacts 
of a solution on the system’s normal operations. Security solutions could be comprised of such services as 
employment of diversely redundant components for failure recovery, dynamic configuration management 
across diverse components to complicate attack surface and data continuity checking to discover attacks in 
progress. Scores for a given security architecture could be assigned through the use of assurance 
arguments, and, as in the case of comparing alternative safety architectures, based upon expert testimony, 
historical information analytical assessments, and experimental data. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The source document method for performing diversity analyses provides engineering pattern that can 
be translated into the domain of systems security. There is overlap between existing systems security 
engineering standards and the recommendations of the method. The challenge in its application will be the 
identification of system security metrics. This is because the method relies on automated detection of 
failures in goal achievement, and reliable methods of reversing declining metrics, both automated and 
manual. 
Nevertheless, this study more generally illustrates that this type of adaptation from the field of safety 
engineering to security can provide valuable insights for systems security through safety MPT reuse. 
Further studies are expected to explore similar adaptations for methods, processes, and tools in other the 
engineering disciplines, such as quality [9], reliability [10], and flexibility [11]. 
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